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Abstract
We show that the types of the witnesses in the Herbrand functional interpretation can be sim-
plified, avoiding the use of “sets of functionals” in the interpretation of implication and universal
quantification. This is done by presenting an alternative formulation of the Herbrand functional
interpretation, which we show to be equivalent to the original presentation. As a result of this in-
vestigation we also strengthen the monotonicity property of the original presentation, and prove
a monotonicity property for our alternative definition.
1 Introduction
Nonstandard Analysis, pioneered by Abraham Robinson [4], gives a formal treatment of the intuitive
“calculus with infinitesimals” common in physics and mathematics until Weierstrass’ epsilon-delta
framework became widespread. Nelson’s internal set theory [2] is an axiomatic approach to Non-
standard Analysis based on ZFC enriched with a predicate “x is standard”. Nelson’s framework has
been formulated for higher-order Peano and Heyting arithmetic, and given a computational interpreta-
tion via Herbrand realizability and the associated nonstandard Dialectica interpretation [8] – we refer
to the later here as the Herbrand functional interpretation. More recently, this Herbrand functional
interpretation has been successfully applied in the characterisation of the computational content of
nonstandard analysis [5–7].
Basic nonstandard Peano and Heyting arithmetic in all finite types, denoted E-HAω
st
and E-PAω
st
,
are obtained by extending the language of E-HAω and E-PAω with a new type construct σ∗, for finite
non-empty subsets of objects of type σ, and a new family of predicate symbols stσ(x) – denoting
that x is a standard element of type σ. These basic systems are then enriched with higher-type
generalisations of principles from nonstandard analysis [2, 4] such as the realization principle
NCRτ,σ : ∀y
τ∃stxσA(x, y)→ ∃stxσ
∗
∀yτ∃x′ ∈xA(x′, y),
underspill
USσ : ∀x
σ(¬stσ(x)→ A(x)) → ∃stxσA(x),
and the transfer rules
∀stxτA(x)
(TR∀τ )∀xτA(x)
∃xτA(x)
(TR∃τ )∃stxτA(x)
.
The key novelty of these interpretations is the realization of the new predicate symbol stσ(x) via finite
subsets of objects of type σ, i.e. one says that sσ
∗
realises stσ(x) whenever x ∈ s. As a consequence
of this the new standardness predicate is eliminated, but an existential quantification over standard
elements is realised by a set of potential witnesses, very much like in a Herbrand disjunction, i.e.
s, r hr ∃stxσA :≡ ∃x∈ s(r hr A)
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where we use bold face letters such as r to denote tuples of variables or terms.
In fact, in the nonstandard interpretations (both Herbrand realizability and functional interpreta-
tion), the realisers of all formulas are of type σ∗, for some type σ, i.e. the realisers are always finite
sets. This was done so that one can demonstrate the monotonicity property
if r hr A and r ⊆ r′ then r′ hr A
so if a sequence of sets r realises a formula A, then any sequence of larger sets will also realise A.
But that introduces a so-called challenge in the interpretations of A → B and ∀stxσA, which are
normally interpreted via functionals, not sets!
The ingenuous solution in [8] was to consider a new form of application operation on sets of
functions. Given a set of functionals f : (σ∗ → τ∗)∗ and a set of arguments r:σ∗, one can “apply” f
to r as
f [r] :≡
⋃
f ′∈f
f ′(r)
so that the interpretations of implication A → B and universal quantification ∀stxσA are defined
using this novel form of set application, e.g.
f hr A→ B ≡ ∀r(r hr A→ f [r] hr B).
It has been recently shown (cf. [3]), however, that an alternative definition of the Herbrand real-
izability is possible, where this new set application is avoided, and the usual functional application is
used instead. The main purpose of the present note is to show that the same holds for the Herbrand
functional interpretation: the use of the set application is not essential. We present an alternative for-
mulation of the Herbrand functional interpretation (Definitions 3.1 and 3.2) which uses the standard
functional application. The two formulations are shown to be equivalent (Theorem 3.4) via construc-
tions (Definition 3.3) that transform realisers for one presentation into another. As a byproduct of our
investigation on the monotonicity of the new presentation (Lemma 3.8), we have also discovered that
the original Herbrand functional interpretation satisfies a stronger monotonicity property (Lemma 2.7)
than originally thought [8, Lemma 5.4], since we can prove monotonicity with respect to a relation
which is weaker than subset inclusion. Throughout the paper we will use A ≡ ∀stnN∃stmN(n = m)
as our running example to illustrate the definitions and constructions.
Since the focus of this paper is more on the structure of the Herbrand functional interpretation
itself, rather than the fact that it interprets E-HAω
st
, we will refer the readers to [8] for the definitions
of the systems E-HAω
st
and E-PAω
st
. We just remark that, as in [8], we will be taking ∀stxσA and
∃stxσA to be primitive notions axiomatised as
∀stxσA⇔ ∀xσ(stσ(x)→ A) ∃stxσA⇔ ∃xσ(stσ(x) ∧A).
This is done in order to take advantage of the fact that the interpretation of
∀xσ(stσ(x)→ A)
can be simplified once one observes the monotonicity property mentioned above (cf. Remark 2.4).
For simplicity, we will also restrict ourselves to the fragment without disjunction A ∨B, since in the
theories above disjunction can be defined from the other connectives and quantifiers as
A ∨B ≡ ∃nN((n = 0→ A) ∧ (n 6= 0→ B)).
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank the anonymous referee for several helpful suggestions.
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2 The Herbrand Functional Interpretation
Similarly to Go¨del’s original functional (Dialectica) interpretation [1], the Herbrand functional in-
terpretation maps each formula A to a new formula ADst(r,u) with two extra sets of free-variables
r and u. In the Herbrand functional interpretation A will be in the language of E-HAω
st
whereas
ADst(r,u) will be a formula of E-HA
ω . We think of r as the positive information in A, and of u as
the negative information in A, since A can be shown, over an appropriate system, to be equivalent to
∃r∀uADst(r,u). In order to better distinguish between the positive and negative information of A,
we will from now on write ADst(r,u) as {A}
r
u. Let us start by determining the types of these tuples
u and r:
Definition 2.1 (ν-types) To each formula A of E-HAω
st
let us associate two tuples ν+A and ν
−
A of types
inductively in the structure of A as follows
ν+
stσ(t) :≡ σ
∗ ν−
stσ(t) :≡ ε
ν+A∧B :≡ ν
+
A , ν
+
B ν
−
A∧B :≡ ν
−
A , ν
−
B
ν+A→B :≡ (ν
+
A → ν
+
B )
∗, (ν+A → ν
−
B → (ν
−
A )
∗)∗ ν−A→B :≡ ν
+
A , ν
−
B
ν+∀xσA :≡ ν
+
A ν
−
∀xσA :≡ ν
−
A
ν+∃xσA :≡ ν
+
A ν
−
∃xσA :≡ (ν
−
A )
∗
ν+∀stxσA :≡ (σ → ν
+
A )
∗ ν−∀stxσA :≡ σ, ν
−
A
ν+∃stxσA :≡ σ
∗, ν+A ν
−
∃stxσA :≡ (ν
−
A )
∗
While the atomic formulas stσ(t) will have computational content, the atomic formulas s =N t
are “computationally empty”. Therefore, for the rest of the paper we will only consider the atomic
formulas stσ(t) (and omit the atomic formulas s = t) when defining constructions or proving results
by induction on the logical structure of a formula. In each of these, the base case when A is s = t
will be trivial.
We will refer to the ν-types as the up types – in contrast to the types of Definition 3.1 which we
will call the down types. Note that the positive up types ν+A are all of the form σ
∗
1, . . . , σ
∗
n for some
σ1, . . . , σn. For instance, considering our running example A ≡ ∀
stnN∃stmN(n = m), according to
Definition 2.1, we have that ν+A ≡ (N→ N
∗)∗ and ν−A ≡ N.
Definition 2.2 (Herbrand functional interpretation, [8, Definition 5.1]) For each formulaA in the
language of E-HAω
st
associate a formula {A}ru, in the language of E-HA
ω, by induction on A, where
r : ν+A and u : ν
−
A , as follows:
{stσ(z)}sε :≡ z ∈ s
{A ∧B}r,tu,v :≡ {A}
r
u ∧ {B}
t
v
{A→ B}f ,gr,u :≡ ∀v∈g[r,u]{A}
r
v → {B}
f [r]
u
{∀xσA(x)}ru :≡ ∀x
σ{A(x)}ru
{∃xσA(x)}ru :≡ ∃x
σ ∀v∈u{A(x)}rv
{∀stxσA(x)}fc,u :≡ {A(c)}
f [c]
u
{∃stxσA(x)}s,ru :≡ ∃x∈ s ∀v∈u{A(x)}rv
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Making use of our running exampleA ≡ ∀stnN∃stmN(n = m)we see that {A}fn ≡ ∃m∈ f [n](n =
m), where f : (N→ N∗)∗ and n:N.
If σ = σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n and r, r
′ : σ, then we write r ⊆σ r
′ as an abbreviation for r1 ⊆σ∗1 r
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧
rn ⊆σ∗n r
′
n.
Lemma 2.3 (Monotonicity, [8, Lemma 5.4]) {A}ru ∧ r ⊆ν+
A
r′ ⊢E-HAω {A}
r′
u .
Remark 2.4 Given that A has interpretation {A}ru, we note that the interpretation of ∀x
σ(stσ(x)→
A) is
{∀xσ(stσ(x)→ A)}fs,u ≡ ∀c∈ s {A(c)}
f [s]
u .
The fact that this interpretation can be simplified to
{∀stxσA(x)}fc,u ≡ {A(c)}
f [c]
u
relies on the monotonicity property above. More specifically, monotonicity is used to prove the sound-
ness of
∀stxσA ⊢ ∀xσ(stσ(x)→ A).
Let us observe that a strengthening of Lemma 2.3 is possible. We can motivate this strengthening
using our running example A ≡ ∀stnN∃stmN(n = m). Recall that ν+A ≡ (N → N
∗)∗ and {A}fn ≡
∃m∈ f [n](n = m). It is clear that tν
+
A ≡ {λn.{n}} witnesses A, since
{A}{λn
′.{n′}}
n ≡ ∃m∈{λn
′.{n′}}[n](n = m) ⇔ ∃m∈{n}(n = m).
But so do t
ν+
A
1 ≡ {λn.{n}, λn.{n + 1}} and t
ν+
A
2 ≡ {λn.{n, n + 1}}. The fact that t1 is also a
witnesses follows directly from Lemma 2.3, since t ⊆ν+
A
t1. But we do not have t ⊆ν+
A
t2, although it
is clear that t2 is a “weakening” of t, in the sense that the function λn.{n} is replaced by the weaker
function λn.{n, n + 1}. The following definition introduces a partial order on the positive up types
ν+A which is weaker than the subset relation:
Definition 2.5 Define the following partial order r ⊑A r
′ between r, r′: ν+A by induction on A as
follows:
s ⊑stσ(z) s
′ :≡ s ⊆σ∗ s
′
r, t ⊑A∧B r
′, t′ :≡ (r ⊑A r
′) ∧ (t ⊑B t
′)
f ,g ⊑A→B f
′,g′ :≡ ∀r(f [r] ⊑B f
′[r]) ∧ ∀r,u(g[r,u] ⊆(ν−
A
)∗ g
′[r,u])
r ⊑∀xσA r
′ :≡ r ⊑A r
′
r ⊑∃xσA r
′ :≡ r ⊑A r
′
f ⊑∀stxσA f
′ :≡ ∀cσ(f [c] ⊑A f
′[c])
s, r ⊑∃stxσA s
′, r′ :≡ (s ⊆σ∗ s
′) ∧ (r ⊑A r
′)
Note that in the definitions for f ,g ⊑A→B f
′,g′ and f ⊑∀stxσA f
′ we are not comparing the sets
of functionals themselves, but rather comparing the sets of values these functionals produce.
Lemma 2.6 Let r, r′: ν+A .
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1. If r ⊆ν+
A
r′ then r ⊑A r
′.
2. There are r and r′ such that r ⊑A r
′ but not r ⊆ν+
A
r′.
Proof: 1. By induction on A. We show here only the case of implication. Assuming f ,g ⊆ν+
A→B
f ′,g′ we have f [r] ⊆
ν+
B
f ′[r] and g[r,u] ⊆(ν−
A
)∗ g
′[r,u], for any rν
+
A and uν
−
B . By the induction
hypothesis we get f [r] ⊑ν+
B
f ′[r] and hence f ,g ⊑A→B f
′,g′.
2. We can use here our running example A ≡ ∀stnN∃stmN(n = m) with ν+A ≡ (N → N
∗)∗. Let
t :≡ {λn.{n}, λn.{n + 1}} and t′ :≡ {λn.{n, n + 1}}. We have neither t ⊆
ν+
A
t′ nor t′ ⊆
ν+
A
t, but
we have that t ⊑A t
′ and t′ ⊑A t.
Lemma 2.7 (Strengthening of Lemma 2.3) {A}ru ∧ r ⊑A r
′ ⊢E-HAω {A}
r′
u .
Proof: By induction on A. We show the case of implication. Assume {A → B}f ,gr,u and f ,g ⊑A→B
f ′,g′. We have f [r] ⊑B f
′[r] and g[r,u] ⊆(ν−
A
)∗ g
′[r,u], and hence
{A→ B}f ,gr,u ≡ ∀v∈g[r,u]{A}
r
v → {B}
f [r]
u
IH
⇒ ∀v∈g′[r,u]{A}rv → {B}
f ′[r]
u
≡ {A→ B}f
′,g′
r,u .
The fact that the above lemma is a strengthening of Lemma 2.3 follows from Lemma 2.6.
3 Alternative Presentation of the Herbrand Functional Interpretation
Our main goal is to show that the set application used in the treatment of A→ B and ∀stxσA can be
replaced with the usual functional application. This will mean that the positive types are no longer
of the form σ∗1, . . . , σ
∗
n, but might contains functionals σ → τ . For that reason we define the down
types:
Definition 3.1 (δ-types) To each formula A of E-HAω
st
let us associate two tuples δ+A and δ
−
A of types
inductively in the structure of A as follows:
δ+
stσ(t) :≡ σ
∗ δ−
stσ(t) :≡ ε
δ+A∧B :≡ δ
+
A , δ
+
B δ
−
A∧B :≡ δ
−
A , δ
−
B
δ+A→B :≡ (δ
+
A → δ
+
B), (δ
+
A → δ
−
B → (δ
−
A)
∗) δ−A→B :≡ δ
+
A , δ
−
B
δ+∀xσA :≡ δ
+
A δ
−
∀xσA :≡ δ
−
A
δ+∃xσA :≡ δ
+
A δ
−
∃xσA :≡ (δ
−
A)
∗
δ+∀stxσA :≡ σ → δ
+
A δ
−
∀stxσA :≡ σ, δ
−
A
δ+∃stxσA :≡ σ
∗, δ+A δ
−
∃stxσA :≡ (δ
−
A)
∗
We will refer to the δ-types as down types.
We are now ready to present our alternative definition of the Herbrand functional interpretation:
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Definition 3.2 (Alternative presentation of the Herbrand functional interpretation) For each for-
mula A in the language of E-HAω
st
associate a formula |A|ru, in the language of E-HA
ω, by induction
on A, where r : δ+A and u : δ
−
A , as follows:
|stσ(z)|sε :≡ z ∈ s
|A ∧B|r,tu,v :≡ |A|
r
u ∧ |B|
t
v
|A→ B|f ,gr,u :≡ ∀v∈gru|A|rv → |B|
fr
u
|∀xσA(x)|ru :≡ ∀x
σ|A(x)|ru
|∃xσA(x)|ru :≡ ∃x
σ ∀v∈u|A(x)|rv
|∀stxσA(x)|fc,u :≡ |A(c)|
fc
u
|∃stxσA(x)|s,ru :≡ ∃x∈ s ∀v∈u|A(x)|
r
v
Let us now show that this new presentation is indeed equivalent to the original presentation, in the
sense that the formulas which are witnessable via the original presentation are precisely the formulas
witnessable by the alternative presentation.
Definition 3.3 Define four constructions to convert between elements of up and down types
(·)A
+↑: δ+A → ν
+
A (·)
A+↓: ν+A → δ
+
A
(·)A
−↑: δ−A → ν
−
A (·)
A−↓: ν−A → δ
−
A
as follows:
s(st
σ(z))+↑ :≡ s (r, t)(A∧B)
+↑ :≡ rA
+↑, tB
+↑
ε(st
σ(z))−↑ :≡ ε (u,v)(A∧B)
−↑ :≡ uA
−↑,vB
−↑
s(st
σ(z))+↓ :≡ s (r, t)(A∧B)
+↓ :≡ rA
+↓, tB
+↓
ε(st
σ(z))−↓ :≡ ε (u,v)(A∧B)
−↓ :≡ uA
−↓,vB
−↓
r(∀x
σA)+↑ :≡ rA
+↑ r(∃x
σA)+↑ :≡ rA
+↑
u(∀x
σA)−↑ :≡ uA
−↑ u(∃x
σA)−↑ :≡ {vA
−↑ : v ∈ u}
r(∀x
σA)+↓ :≡ rA
+↓ r(∃x
σA)+↓ :≡ rA
+↓
u(∀x
σA)−↓ :≡ uA
−↓ u(∃x
σA)−↓ :≡ {vA
−↓ : v ∈ u}
f (∀
stxσA)+↑ :≡ {λcσ.(fc)A
+↑} (s, r)(∃
stxσA)+↑ :≡ s, rA
+↑
(c,u)(∀
stxσA)−↑ :≡ c,uA
−↑ u(∃
stxσA)−↑ :≡ {vA
−↑ : v ∈ u}
f (∀
stxσA)+↓ :≡ λcσ.(f [c])A
+↓ (s, r)(∃
stxσA)+↓ :≡ s, rA
+↓
(c,u)(∀
stxσA)−↓ :≡ c,uA
−↓ u(∃
stxσA)−↓ :≡ {vA
−↓ : v ∈ u}
(f ,g)(A→B)
+↑ :≡ {λrν
+
A .(f(rA
+↓))B
+↑}, {λrν
+
Aλuν
−
B .{vA
−↑ : v ∈ grA
+↓uB
−↓}}
(r,u)(A→B)
−↑ :≡ rA
+↑,uB
−↑
(f ,g)(A→B)
+↓ :≡ λrδ
+
A .(f [rA
+↑])B
+↓, λrδ
+
Aλuδ
−
B .{vA
−↓ : v ∈ g[rA
+↑,uB
−↑]}
(r,u)(A→B)
−↓ :≡ rA
+↓,uB
−↓
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Let us illustrate this definition with our example A ≡ ∀stnN∃stmN(n = m) with ν+A ≡ (N →
N
∗)∗. Given tν
+
A ≡ {λn.{n}, λn.{n + 1}}, we have that tA
+↓ ≡ λn.{n, n + 1}. Intuitively, we can
see here that (·)A
+↓ works as a “flattening” operation, inductively turning sets of functions (which
produce sets) into a single function producing the union of the image sets.
Theorem 3.4 We have that
1. {A}r
uA
−↑
⊢E-HAω |A|
rA
+↓
u ,
2. |A|r
uA
−↓
⊢E-HAω {A}
rA
+↑
u .
Proof: We prove the two points by a simultaneous induction on the logical form of A. The only
non-trivial cases are implication A→ B and the universal quantifier ∀stxσA:
Implication 1.:
{A→ B}f ,g
(r,u)(A→B)
−↑
≡ {A→ B}f ,g
rA
+↑,uB
−↑
≡ ∀v∈g[rA
+↑,uB
−↑]{A}r
A
+↑
v → {B}
f [rA
+↑]
uB
−↑
IH
⇒ ∀v∈g[rA
+↑,uB
−↑]|A|r
vA
−↓
→ |B|
(f [rA
+↑])B
+↓
u
≡ |A→ B|
(f ,g)(A→B)
+↓
r,u
Implication 2.: Let f˜ :≡ {λrν
+
A .(f(rA
+↓))B
+↑} and g˜ :≡ {λrν
+
Aλuν
−
B .{vA
−↑ : v ∈ grA
+↓uB
−↓)}}.
Then
|A→ B|f ,g
(r,u)(A→B)
−↓
≡ |A→ B|f ,g
rA
+↓,uB
−↓
≡ ∀v∈grA
+↓uB
−↓|A|r
A
+↓
v → |B|
frA
+↓
uB
−↓
IH
⇒ ∀v∈grA
+↓uB
−↓{A}r
vA
−↑
→ {B}
(frA
+↓)B
+↑
u
≡ ∀v∈ g˜[r,u]{A}rv → {B}
f˜ [r]
u
≡ {A→ B}
(f ,g)(A→B)
+↑
r,u
Universal (standard):
{∀stxσA}f
(c,u)(∀stxσA)−↑
|∀stxσA|f
(c,u)(∀stxσA)−↓
≡ {∀stxσA}f
c,u(A)
−↑
≡ |∀stxσA|f
c,u(A)
−↓
≡ {A[c/x]}
f [c]
uA
−↑
≡ |A[c/x]|fc
uA
−↓
IH
⇒ |A[c/x]|
(f [c])A
+↓
u
IH
⇒ {A[c/x]}
(fc)A
+↑
u
≡ |∀stxσA|f
(∀stxσA)+↓
c,u ≡ {∀
stxσA}f
(∀stxσA)+↑
c,u
We leave the other simple cases to the reader.
Corollary 3.5 A principle is witnessable by the original Herbrand functional interpretation (Defini-
tion 2.2) iff it is witnessable by the alternative presentation of the Herbrand functional interpretation
(Definition 3.2).
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Proof: Assume the original Herbrand functional interpretation of A is witnessable, i.e. we have
a term rν
+
A such that ∀uν
−
A {A}ru. In particular we have ∀u
δ−
A{A}r
uA
−↑
and, by Theorem 3.4 (1),
∀uδ
−
A |A|r
A
+↓
u . So that r
A+↓ can be seen to be a witness for the alternative Herbrand functional inter-
pretation of A. The converse is proved similarly using Theorem 3.4 (2).
Since in |A|ru the witnesses r need not be of finite set type, the monotonicity property as formu-
lated in Lemma 2.3 does not even make sense for |A|ru. We conclude by showing that a monotonicity
property similar to (the stronger) Lemma 2.7 also holds for the alternative presentation of the Her-
brand functional interpretation.
Definition 3.6 A finite type σ is called a ∗-type if it is either of the form ρ∗, for some finite type ρ, or
of the form ρ → τ with τ being a ∗-type. Define a partial order x σ x
′ on ∗-types inductively as
follows:
s σ∗ s
′ :≡ s ⊆σ∗ s
′
f σ→ρ f
′ :≡ ∀xσ (fx ρ f
′x)
If t, t′ are tuples of terms of types σ, then we write
t σ t
′ :≡ t1 σ1 t
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn σn t
′
n.
Intuitively, t σ t
′ is the usual subset relation when t is a finite set, but it is defined inductively
and pointwise when t is a functional.
Lemma 3.7 When σ is a tuple of positive down type σ ≡ δ+A , we will write r A r
′ instead of
r δ+
A
r′. Noting that δ+A is a sequence of ∗-types, we have:
s stσ(z) s
′ ≡ s ⊆σ∗ s
′
r, t A∧B r
′, t′ ≡ (r A r
′) ∧ (t B t
′)
f ,g A→B f
′,g′ ≡ ∀r(fr B f
′r) ∧ ∀r,u(gru ⊆(δ−
A
)∗ g
′ru)
r ∀xσA r
′ ≡ r A r
′
r ∃xσA r
′ ≡ r A r
′
f ∀stxσA f
′ ≡ ∀cσ(fc A f
′c)
s, r ∃stxσA s
′, r′ ≡ (s ⊆σ∗ s
′) ∧ (r A r
′)
The alternative presentation of the Herbrand functional interpretation satisfies the following mono-
tonicity property:
Lemma 3.8 (Monotonicity property) |A|ru ∧ r A r
′ ⊢E-HAω |A|
r′
u .
Proof: By induction on A. Here we prove only the case of implication. Assume that |A→ B|f ,gu,r and
f ,g A→B f
′,g′. We have fr B f
′r and gru ⊆(δ−
A
)∗ g
′ru and hence
|A→ B|f ,gu,r ≡ ∀v∈gru|A|
r
v → |B|
fr
u
IH
⇒ ∀v∈g′ru|A|rv → |B|
f ′r
u ≡ |A→ B|
f ′,g′
u,r .
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